Tarik Moataz

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I am a Principal Research Scientist and the research manager of the MongoDB Cryptography Research group. Before MongoDB’s acquisition, I co-founded and served as Chief Technology Officer at Aroki Systems. Prior to that, I worked as a postdoctoral research associate under the mentorship of Seny Kamara, followed by a role as a visiting scientist in the Computer Science Department at Brown University.

My research interests lie in cryptography and security, with a particular focus on both the theoretical and practical aspects of encrypted search. My recent work has particularly focused on enhancing search functionality, mitigating and formalizing leakage, and designing cryptanalytic attacks to assess practical security guarantees. I am also interested in translating cryptographic research into real-world systems. One of my significant contributions is the cryptographic co-design of MongoDB Queryable Encryption.

While affiliated with Brown University, I co-directed the Encrypted Systems Lab. I have also been affiliated as a research visitor or intern with Bell Labs, Microsoft Research, Airbus, Northeastern University and the National University of Singapore.

news

Jun 01, 2026 Our paper, On the Costs of Multi-Server Volume-Hiding, will appear at SCN ‘26. In this work, we show that the communication complexity must be at least linear in the maximum response length of the multi-map, even in the multi-server setting.
Feb 01, 2026 Our paper, Resizable Oblivious RAM, will appear at Eurocrypt ‘26. In this work, we further investigate resizability in oblivious RAM and, in doing so, propose two concretely efficient resizable ORAMs that build upon the non-recursive and recursive variants of Path ORAM.
Jan 01, 2026 Our paper, tigro: Trust Infrastructure for Grassroots Organizing via Grounded Digital Annotations, will appear at PETS ‘26. This work proposes a novel trust infrastructure and system specifically designed for grassroots organizing contexts.
Dec 02, 2025 Our paper, Leafblower: a Leakage Attack Against TEE-Based Encrypted Databases will appear at IEEE S&P ‘26. In this work, we propose a new leakage attack against TEE-based EDBs which use B+-trees in the multi-snapshot external memory model, a weaker adversary which only observes snapshots of the encrypted database index files after each operation.
Nov 01, 2025 Our paper, Updatable Private Set Intersection from Structured Encryption will appear at CiC ‘26 (Volume 4, Issue 2). We propose a new framework for the problem of updatable PSI — with elements being inserted and deleted — in the semi-honest model based on structured encryption.